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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 940500-CA
Priority No. 2

TRACY ALAN CANDELARIO,
Defendant/Appellant•

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1994).
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:
[Criminal actions - Provisions concerning - Due process of
law and just compensation clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or
indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the
land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual
service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any
person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be
deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
section 1 provides:
Section 1. [Citizenship —
protection.]

Due process of law —

Equal

All persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
1

State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution provides:
Sec. 7

[Due Process of law.]

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law.
Utah Code Ann. 76-3-203 (1995) provides in pertinent part:
76-3-203. Felony conviction — Indeterminate term of
imprisonment — Increase of sentence if firearm
used.
A person who has been convicted of a felony may be
sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as
follows:
. . . .

(2) In the case of a felony of the second degree,
for a term at not less than one year nor more than 15
years but if the trier of fact finds a firearm or a
facsimile or the representation of a firearm was used
in the commission or furtherance of the felony, the
court shall additionally sentence the person convicted
for a term of one year to run consecutively and not
concurrently; and the court may additionally sentence
the person convicted for an indeterminate term not to
exceed five years to run consecutively and not
concurrently;
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Point.

Whether the trial court erred in construing the

firearm enhancement provision in Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(2) to
apply to Mr. Candelario's case?
Standard of Review —

Correctness.

of statutory interpretation.

This issue is a question

This Court reviews the trial

court's "statutory interpretation for correctness, according it
no particular deference."

State v. Masciantonio, 850 P.2d 492,

493 (Utah App. 1993) (citing, State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843, 844
2

(Utah 1992).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Mr. Candelario was charged by information on December 15,
1993, with one count of aggravated robbery, a first degree felony
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302. Record on Appeal,
("R.") at 9-10.

At the time Mr. Candelario was arrested in this

case, on December 13, 1993, he was on parole from a sentence of
five years to life for a previous conviction.

R. 29. Mr.

Candelario had been committed to the Utah State Prison on that
conviction on February 19, 1986, and was paroled on October 27,
1992.
Due to the instant charge, the Board of Pardons issued a
warrant for Mr. Candelario's arrest and he was returned to the
Utah State Prison on December 13, 1993. On February 23, 1994,
Mr. Candelario appeared before the Board of Pardons for a parole
violation hearing and the hearing was continued pending
adjudication of this case. Id.1
On June 24, 1994, pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr.
Candelario entered a plea of guilty to Robbery, a second degree
felony and lesser included offense of Count I of the information.
R. 19. The State agreed to recommend that his sentence be run
concurrent with his previous five to life sentence, and agreed
not to seek an additional sentence for "gun enhancement."

Id.

On June 24, 1994, Mr. Candelario appeared before the
1

Mr. Candelario's parole was apparently revoked. Transcript
of Plea Hearing, held June 24, 1994, (hereinafter referred to by
Court of Appeals record number), R. 68.
3

honorable Timothy R. Hanson, Third Judicial District Court Judge,
to change his plea to guilty to count I of the Amended
Information, charging Robbery, a second degree felony in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301. R. 61-72.

Judge Hanson

accepted Mr. Candelario's plea of guilty to one count of Robbery.
R. 72.
On July 22, 1994, Mr. Candelario was sentenced to an
indeterminate term of one to fifteen years. The court also
imposed a one year to be served consecutively under the provision
in Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203. The sentences were imposed to run
concurrent with the five years to life sentence that Mr.
Candelario was already serving.

R. 30, 52-53.

The Judgement was

filed July 26, 1994. R. 30. Mr. Candelario filed a timely
Notice of Appeal on August 2, 1994. R. 34.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
At the time of Mr. Candelario,s guilty plea, the Information
was amended to Robbery instead of Aggravated Robbery.

The court

also struck the language: "and in the course of a committing said
robbery used or threatened the use of a dangerous weapon, to wit:
a gun."

Attached as Addendum A; R. 9, 61.

In Mr. Candelario,s Statement of Defendant Certificate of
Counsel and Order, he admitted that on November 30, 1993, he
"unlawfully and intentionally took personal property in the
possession of Hercules Credit Union from the person or immediate
presence of Michelle Neff by the use of force or fear."
as Addendum B, R. 20.

Attached

It was agreed by counsel for the State
4

I,hat there was in laci

:> evidence of a firearm used by Mr.

Candelario in the commissi on of the Robber

-58.

The following exchange occurred at
heai

lea

^ference to the gun enhancement:

Ms. Wells [counsel for defense]: Your Honor, in this
matter, we had been before you once before, and the Court had
concern about whether or not a firearm enhancement applied. Mr.
Jones and I have talked. Mr. Jones came over particularly for
this matter, and we would indicate to the Court that I have
amended the previously prepared statement of defendant to include
the fact that any felony offense may include a gun enhancement,
and I've added that on the second degree felony it would be a
mandatory one year with a discretionary up to five years. So
that has now become part of the bargain.
I would indicate to you, however, that we — the matter has
been amended to robbery for several reasons. One's the
defendant's cooperation with police authorities on his own and
other matters, and additionally, because in fact the robbery
committed by Mr. Candelario included reference to a firearm, but
there was in fact no firearm used. So we'll leave that to Your
Honor for sentencing purposes, but with that explanation. But
Mr. Candelario is now aware, and it has been included on this,
that the Court must impose one year if you find certain things,
and it can be a discretionary five.
The court: So do I understand that ultimately what the
facts of this case will show is that Mr. Candelario did not
actually display a weapon, and in fact did not have one, but told
someone he did?
Ms. Wells: Yes.
Mr. Jones [prosecutor]: Well, I thii ik that your assessment
of what Ms. Wells says is correct. This is a situation where he
goes into the bank, and tells the cashier he's got a gun, if she
doesn't give him the money he's going to be [sic] kill her. She
really thought he had a gun. In his confession later on, he
indicates later on he was just trying to scare her. He didn't
have a gun in his possession. That was primarily the factor that
went into reducing this into a second degree.
8.

During the plea colloquy between the court and Mr.

Candelario, the court asked Fh

randelario a few questions

related to the factual basis for Robbery, but risked H'u qu^st ions
5

related to the factual basis for the gun enhancement:
The court: Mr. Candelario, under the amended information
where you're charged with robbery, a second degree felony, there
are certain factual bases, or elements that make up that charge.
I'm going to discuss each on of those with you and ask you to
listen carefully to the following, because by pleading guilty
you're telling me the following things are true. First, that the
crime occurred at 3141 West 4700 South here in Salt Lake County,
State of Utah. Secondly, the crime occurred on or about November
30th of 1993. The third element is that you were the person that
committed the crime. The substance of the offense is that you
unlawfully, and intentionally, that means you had no legal basis,
and you knew that, and went ahead anyway, took personal property
from the possession of Hercules Credit Union form the person, or
immediate presence of Michelle Neff. And that's a lot of fancy
language meaning you went into Hercules Credit Union, and
demanded money or other property from them, and you didn't have
any right to that. Do you understand that?
Mr. Candelario:

Yes, Your Honor.

The court: And also that you did it in the immediate
presence — that you confronted Michelle Neff, and demanded the
money or property from her. Do you understand that?
Mr. Candelario:
The court:

Did those things occur?

Mr. Candelario:
The court:

Yes, Your Honor.

It says here $2,000.

Mr. Candelario:
R. 66-67.

Yes, Your Honor.

Is that right?

Yes, Your Honor.

The court then continued with other questions related

to the voluntariness of the plea.

R. 67-69.

At Mr. Candelario's sentencing hearing, the following
exchange occurred between counsel for Mr. Candelario and the
court regarding the gun enhancement:
Ms. Wells: One other thing. It was charged as an
aggravated robbery, because there was an illusion [sic] to a
firearm. As we discussed at the last hearing, there is no
indication, and I believe Mr. Jones substantiated that, that
there was in fact any firearm. And so although it was originally
charged that way, and he made reference to one, we, as a group,
6

believe that one did no t exist, and hopefully that will have some
bearing on your decision as we2 1
The court: But it doesn't change the necessity of imposing
an enhancement of a firearm.
Ms. Wells: I think that is within your discretion at this
point, because it is still there. We acknowledge it was there,
but I think you would have to feel that there was a factual basis
for it in order to actually impose it. I leave that to your
discretion. I know we've gone over this before, but what Mr.
Jones said at the time was that, you know, we acknowledge that
the offense carries it, but in actuality we have no evidence that
one was utilized.
The court: The firearms enhancement applies if a person
makes a representation that they have a firearm, even if they do
not.
Ms. Wells: ii does for purposes of elevating the offense to
aggravated robbery, yes. For purposes of an enhancement, I think
that that is less clear, and becomes discretionary.
The Court:

Mr. Blaylock.

Mr. Blaylock [prosecutor]: Mr. Jones' comments are that the
defendant told the cashier he had a gun, but he never showed her
a gun, that we were willing to let him plead guilty to robbery,
as second degree felony, because a gun was not exhibited. He
says under 76-3-203(2) the Court can enhance the sentence, that's
an additional one year, and may add five years if the Court
determines that a firearm was — he put in quotation marks —
used in the commission of the offense. He says, in confessing,
he said the defendant wanted the cashier to believe he had a gun.
The court: That's the whole point of the enhancement, not
whether you've got one, whether you tell somebody you have. What
difference does it make?
R,,, 4 9-50.
Ultimately, the court riil ed as follows:
Sounds to me like an ideal question for one of the
appellate courts \ consider. I can't see a dime's
worth of difference if you're the person standing there
being robbed where a person represents they have a
firearm, or whether or not it's displayed, they believe
you, the fear is still there. I suppose there's a lot
of aggravated robberies that don't result in a
shooting. We all know how I feel about firearms. You
use a firearm, you get an enhancement, or if you
7

represent you have one. If that's wrong, the appellate
courts can figure a way to get around the statute. But
that doesn't change my mind about it. The fact that
there wasn't one may have some impact on whether or not
this sentence should run consecutively to what he's
already doing. Is there anything further?
R. 51. The court then imposed the gun enhancement as a one year
consecutive sentence to the one to fifteen year sentence for the
robbery.

R. 52.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The trial court improperly interpreted the language of the
firearms enhancement provision in Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(2)
("Enhancement Statute"), providing for an enhanced penalty when
"a firearm or a facsimile or a representation of a firearm" is
used during the commission of a felony, to apply to the present
case.

Specifically, the trial court improperly construed the

Enhancement Statute by concluding that a threat made by Mr.
Candelario, stating he had a firearm, was a "representation of a
firearm."
The plain language of the Enhancement Statute, as well as
the legislative history behind it, shows that the Legislature
intended the language "representation of a firearm" to mean a
"likeness" of a firearm rather than a simple statement or threat
that a defendant possesses or will use a firearm.
Any ambiguity in the meaning of the Statute should be
resolved in favor of Mr. Candelario.

The firearm enhancement

portion of Mr. Candelario's sentence should therefore be vacated.

8

ARGUMENT
POINT.

THE TRIAL COURT I M p R 0 P E R L Y CONSTRUED THE LANGUAGE IN
THE ENHANCEMENT STATUTE, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-203 AND
THEREFORE IMPROPERLY ENHANCED MR. CANDELARIO'S
SENTENCE.

A.
THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE ENHANCEMENT STATUTE REVEALS
THAT THE LEGISLATURE INTENDED THE PHRASE, "REPRESENTATION OF A
FIREARM," TO MEAN A "LIKENESS" OR "IMAGE" OF A FIREARM RATHER
THAN A STATEMENT THAT THE DEFENDANT POSSESSES A FIREARM.
W1H?I«

J«

fi» prprpf i tui "he language of a statute, this Court will

first look

he statute's plain language-* .yurl - ill "resort to

other methods of statutory interpretation only it tlie ! ai'iguacje is
ambiguous "

State v. Masciantonio, 850 P.2d 442, 4 93 (Utah 1993)

(citing, Vigil, 8*° ° ~>* at

;5). "A statute is ambiguous if it
r

can be understood by reasonably well-informed persons
differen

,"

233 (Utah App. 1990).

e

Tanner v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 799 P. 2d «2Jl,
In order to give ctlerl in I:he legislative

intent of the language in question, the reviewing court assumes
that -i-t^ Legitblal HI e 'Vised each term advisedly/1 and
effec

) each term according to its c
,"

Masciantonio, 850 P.2d

give[s]

UK! incepted
(citing, Versluis v.

, oo / ^ l -'

Guaranty Nat'l. Cos. f 84 2 I'" ;,.":d 8

rt

'••-.•' specific language to be examined i

^° • ) •
Utah code

Vb-3-203(2) (Replacement 'volume 1995), which provides in
pertinent part:
A person who has been convicted of a felony may be
sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as
follows:
(2) In the case of a felony of the second degree, for
a term at not less than one year nor more than 15 years
but if the trier of fact finds a firearm or a facsimile
or the representation of a firearm was used in the
9

commission or furtherance of the felony, the court
shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a
term of one year to run consecutively and not
concurrently; and the court may additionally sentence
the person convicted for an indeterminate term not to
exceed five years to run consecutively and not
concurrently;
(Emphasis added).

There is no evidence in the record that a

firearm, or a facsimile of a firearm was used by Mr. Candelario
during the robbery.

The court relied on the term "representation

of a firearm" to enhance Mr. Candelario's sentence. Therefore,
the question is whether, pursuant to that language, Mr.
Candelario's sentence can be enhanced based only on his threat,
telling the bank employee that he had a gun.
In order to determine the plain meaning of the terms used in
a statute, courts generally rely on the usual and accepted
meanings found in a dictionary.

State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843,

845 (Utah 1992); State v. Masciantonio, 850 P.2d 492, 494 (Utah
1993); State In Interest of J.L.S., 610 P.2d 1294, 1295 n. 4
(Utah 1980); State v. Paul. 860 P.2d 992, 993-94 (Utah App.
1993).

Accordingly, Webster's New World Dictionary, Third

College Edition (copyright 1994) (hereinafter, "Webster's")
defines "representation" as:
1 a representing or being represented (in various
senses); specif., the fact of representing or being
represented in a legislative assembly 2 legislative
representatives, collectively 3 a likeness, image,
picture, etc. 4 [often pi.} a description, account, or
statement of facts, allegations, or arguments, esp. one
intended to influence action, persuade hearers, make
protest, etc. 5 the production or performance of a
play, etc. 6 Law a statement or implication of fact,
oral or written, as made by one party to induce another
to enter into a contract
10

original), 2

ia JJUXU u j : ^
-r • •

n

be imme<

f

>

Definitic

lumbers

ru] ed on t, as they i **-r -

n

2,

f

specific

meanings and contexts that are obviously not appi„
.estion.
and •

That

.e

leaves two possibilities, definitions

-~ach having different Kiean i rigs.

However, neither refer

w.w ci "threat" -* statement "threatening" a person.
I

determine which meaning the legislature

intended, this Cour4" w i n
the assumption that

cor*

- ..

representation" with

".•:..- advisedly and that the intent of
i

evealeu ±ii - .<

the Legislatur e i s

f the term in the context

and structure in which it is placed."
(emphasis In original).
the "coin.eat

J *>.2d at 994

Examining the term "representati on" in

ami «,1 ruci lire in which

the disjunctive and is placed aftt
facsimile . . . .""

Paul.

§ 36-3-203.

' --- placed/ 1

It is used Ln

** •• s "I irearm, 01 1

Webster's defines "facsim

as:
1 (an) exact reproduction or copy 2 the transmission
and reproduction of graphic matter by electrical means,
as by radio or wire
(bold type in oriq 111a I )i Therefore, examined
i n Webster

•

J

••

at ^6o.

context, of -

oosed

representation,11 only definition number 3, a

"likeness"
Enhancement Statute.

' i s cor isi stei it wi th the other terms in the
A "likeness" > . 'image" ml .1 lirearm JN

2

The designation
[often pi.] which appears prior to
definition number 4, is a designation used by the editor to note
that it is often the plural form of the word that has the meaning
given in that definition. Webster's, (foreword entitled "Guide to
the Use of the Dictionary"), at XV.
11

different from an "exact reproduction," just as a "facsimile" or
"exact reproduction" of a firearm is different from an actual
firearm.

The legislature therefore intended that the definition

for "facsimile," ("exact reproduction"), provided for instances
where a replica of a firearm is used, whereas, the definition of
"representation" provided for instances where a person creates a
"likeness" or "image" of a firearm other than a replica.

A mere

statement that a person possesses a firearm does not fit within
the clear meaning of the language and context of the Enhancement
Statute.
In Paul, this Court stated:
[W]e have nothing to do with what the law ought to be.
We must be guided by the law as it is. We cannot by
construction liberalize the statute and enlarge its
provisions. When language is clear and unambiguous, it
must be held to mean what it expresses, an no room is
left for construction.
Paul, 860 P.2d at 994-95 (quoting, Hanchett v. Burbidge, 202 P.2d
377, 380 (Utah 1921)).

The Legislature could have easily added

the language, "or a threat of the use of a firearm."

Indeed,

similar language is used in the Aggravated Robbery statute, § 766-302, which provides in pertinent part:
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the
course of committing robbery, he:
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as
defined in Section 76-1-601;
. . . .

The Aggravated Robbery statute was adopted in 1973 and,
therefore, the Legislature must have known of its existence in
1976.

Yet, there is no language in the Enhancement Statute

regarding the mere threat of the use of a firearm.
12

The language

it; very

f

»pe iiu and its context does not allow for a definition

for the term "representat i on" l.lwit in any w«i\ equates to a mere
"threat,"
Ac

:'. .

y, where as here, the language, context, structure

and use of terms in other statutes si IOW tit iat t .1 ie 1 legislature
intended the word "representation" to mean a "1 ikeness" or
"inuigo," IJ,»O trial cour t erroneously "liberalizefd]" the meaning
of the Enhancement Statute to include- a st ateiivont m, threat by
the defendant that he had a firearm.

See Paul. 860

d »+• Q94.

B.
THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ENHANCEMENT STATUTE
SUPPORTS MR, CANDELARIO'S PROPOSED CONSTRUCTION AND DISPELS ANY
AMBIGUITY IN THE TERM "REPRESENTATION."
The legislative history of the Enhancement Statute support's
Mr. Cano

construction of the phrase,

"representation of; a firearm "
came from an amendment

The language uttdct cnnsiiierat \ on

». w , ,

during the

, made by Senator Rinstrom
session.

During the floor

debate Ln the Senate, Senator Rinstrom explained th*-? scope ol the
amendment:
Ser

p

instrom: Now, Mr. President, a second motion x would have
to amend this bill [H.B. 3] as follows is again in
those same places, calling your attention to line
18 after the word "firearm," add these words: "or
a facsimile or the representation of the same was
used in the commission or furtherance of a
felony."

Mr. President: Or a facsimile or what?
•Sen, Hinsstrom: "or a facsimile or the representation of the
same.11 Now, let me give you the example of where
I'm going. Sorry to report I represented a young
man on an armed robbery charge. I was successful
in finding him innocent. He later was arrested on
a second one and confessed to eighteen armed
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robberies including the one that I had represented
him on, and he'd all done it with a cap pistol.
But the people at the other end of that barrel
didn't know what they were facing, and they were
just as in great a shock and trauma as if a real
gun had been pointed to them. So I think that we
ought to include a facsimile. Or, this would also
include the man who has his hand in his pocket and
points it at vou and says, lfI have a gun here, and
if you don't hand over the cash, I'm going to
shoot you." So, what this amendment would do is
saying that if a person uses a gun, its facsimile,
or represents that he has a firearm, he could
equally be sentenced to an additional five years.
That's the purpose of the amendment. (emphasis
added)
Mr. President: Senator Brockbank.
Sen. Brockbank:

(inaudible) representation of same to
representation of a firearm.

Mr. President: That's good.
Sen. Brockbank:

That's a good suggestion.

Because I think you might refer back to a
facsimile.

Mr. President: That's right.
Sen. Brockbank:

That's right.

(inaudible) to firearms.

Sen. Rinstrom: And the representation of a firearm.
Mr. President: And that will also have to go into all three
places?
Sen. Rinstrom: That's correct.
Mr. President: Okay. That carries a bit more significance than
the other one, I would think, if it (inaudible)
some gesture on the part of the person as opposed
to carrying a real firearm.
Sen. Rinstrom: I might say that this bill does not deal just with
robberies. It's the commission of any felony in
which a firearm would be used, a facsimile or the
representation.
Mr. President: Would this be a representation.
Sen. Rinstrom: I don't think if you pointed your finger at me
that that would be a representation.
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But—

(emphasis added)

Mr, President: It might look like a gun—
Sen. Rinstrom: Well—
Mr. President: to somebody in the dark.
Sen. Rinstrom: I think a reasonable man, if he was seeing that.
would not conclude that you had a firearm. If you
came up behind me at night and stuck your finger
in your back and said. "This is a gun. If you
don't hand me your wallet. I'm going to shoot
you.11 that would be a representation, yes.
(emphasis added)
Senate Budget Session. Senate Floor Debate on House Bill 3.
Amendment number 2. January 26. 1976. Senator Rinstrom7s Second
Amendment. (transcribed and attached as Addendum C), at pp. 1-2.
During the House Debate of Senator Rinstrom's second
amendment, Representative Hansen explained:
Mr. Speaker, I've reviewed this and what, in effect, it
is, if you use a facsimile of a gun or you put your
finger in the back of someone and say it is a gun or
hold your coat or something similar to that, the same
sentence could be imposed upon a felon who did that. I
think its effect strengthens the Bill and I would make
the motion that we accept the amendment of the Senate.
Legislative Budget Session. Day 16. House Floor Debate on Senate
Amendments to House Bill 3. January 27. 1976. transcribed and
attached hereto as Addendum D, p. 1.
The examples used during the floor debate further support
Mr. Candelario#s proposed definition of "representation."

The

first example used by Senator Rinstrom referred to a person who
put their hand in their pocket, making it look like a gun, which
is consistent with the "likeness" or "image" definition.

During

the floor debate, the Senate President apparently pointed his
15

finger like a gun and asked whether it was a representation.
Senator Rinstrom replied that a reasonable person would not
conclude that the President's finger was a firearm.

Senator

Rinstrom continued with another example:
If you came up behind me at night and stuck your finger
in your back and said, "This is a gun. If you don't
hand me your wallet, I'm going to shoot you," that
would be a representation, yes.
Senate Debate at 2. Again, the example given is of a person
creating a "likeness" or "image" of a gun.
Both the Senate and House debates show that the Legislature
intended that the amendment to H.B. 3 apply only where either a
replica (under the term "facsimile"), or a "likeness" or "image"
(under the term "representation") of a firearm was used, which a
reasonable person would believe was a firearm.

There was no

discussion regarding a mere threat or statement that a defendant
possessed a firearm.

The clear intention was that the term

"representation" referred to the creation of a "likeness" or
"image" of a firearm.
C.
UNDER THE WELL ESTABLISHED RULE OF LENITY, ANY POSSIBLE
AMBIGUITY IN THE MEANING OF THE PHRASE, "REPRESENTATION OF A
FIREARM," MUST BE CONSTRUED IN FAVOR OF MR. CANDELARIO.
It is a "well established" rule in criminal cases that any
ambiguity in a statute must be resolved in favor of the
defendant.

State v. Egbert, 748 P.2d 558, 562 n. 3 (Utah 1987)

(dissenting opinion by Justice Durham); Accord Simpson v. United
States, 435 U.S. 6, 14-15, 98 S.Ct. 909, 55 L.Ed.2d 70 (1978)
("ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be
resolved in favor of lenity.")
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Mr. Candelario has proposed the most logical and reasonable
construction of the Enhancement Statute that is consistent with
its plain language, context, and legislative history.

His

construction is also consistent with the United States Supreme
Court's stated "reluctance to increase or multiply punishments
absent a clear and definite legislative directive."
U.S. at 15-16.

Simpson, 435

The trial court's conclusion that the term

"representation" applies to a threatening statement, with no
showing of any "likeness" or "image" of a firearm, is not
consistent with the plain language of the statute, its context or
its legislative history.

Even if the trial court's construction

raises another meaning, creating ambiguity in the term
"representation," that ambiguity must be construed in favor of
Mr. Candelario's proposed construction.
When read in context with the other language of the
Statute, the language is unambiguous in its meaning as a
"likeness" or "image" of a firearm.

Had the legislature intended

that merely making a statement threatening to use a firearm,
creating no "likeness" or "image," it could easily have included
such language.

It did not, however, and this Court should not

broaden or "liberalize" the terms of the Enhancement Statute.
Cf. Paul, 860 P.2d at 994. Rather, this Court should construe
any possible ambiguity in favor of the reasonable construction
proposed by Mr. Candelario.
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REASONS SUPPORTING ARGUMENT/PUBLISHED DECISION
Due to the complex nature of the issue involved, and the
lack of existing case law interpreting the firearms Enhancement
Statute under these circumstances, Mr. Candelario believes that
oral argument will materially assist this Court in the resolution
of this Appeal. Mr. Candelario therefore respectfully requests
oral argument before this Court and requests that a published
decision be issued.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing discussion, Mr. Candelario
respectfully requests that this Court vacate the one year
enhancement to his sentence imposed by the District Court.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2AJJL

day of May, 1995.

D a v J i F ^
^At€orney for Defendant/Appellant

Robert K. Heineman
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, David V. Finlayson, hereby certify that I have
caused eight copies of the foregoing to be delivered to the Utah
Court of Appeals, 400 Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84102, and four copies to the Attorney General's
Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this
3d±L

day of May, 1995.

Dav^d^V. /Finlayson

DELIVERED/MAILED this

day of May, 1995.
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ADDENDUM A

DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake County Attorney
ERNEST W. JONES, Bar No. 1736
Deputy County Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900

IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

Screened by:
Assigned to:

E. JONES
E. JONES

Plaintiff,
BAIL:

NO BAIL
I N F O R M A T I O N

-vsTRACY ALAN CANDELARIO,
DOB 7/13/66
OTN 7155575
Defendant.

Case No.

9310/7**3 FS

The undersigned Det. Don Garner - Salt Lake County Sherifffs
Office, under oath states on information and belief that the
defendant, committed the crime of:
COUNT I
*~W<-A
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, a Pairafe Degree Felony, at 3141 West 4700
South, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about
November 30, 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6,
Section 302, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that
the defendant, TRACY ALAN CANDELARIO, a party to the
offense, unlawfully and intentionally took personal property
in the possession of Hercules Credit Union from the person
or immediate presence of Michelle Neff, and in the oouroe of
rnmmitting—oaid—rubbmy used—w?—threatened—the—*ase—of—et
• dangeroua weapon, to-wits—a gun-.
NO BAIL REQUEST:
The defendant TRACY ALAN CANDELARIO is
currently on Parole for another felony to-wit: Aggravated
Robbery.
Therefore, pursuant to Article I, Section 8, Utah
Constitution, it is requested that the defendant be held without
bail on the above charge.
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INFORMATION
STATE OF UTAH v, TRACY ALAN CANDELARIO
County Attorney No. 93 001241
Page 2

THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING
WITNESSES:
Det. James Glover, Det. Don Garner, Mark Holding, Michelle
Neff and Penny Christensen.
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT:
Your affiant based this information on police report no. 93154168.
The Defendant admitted to Detective James Glover that he
entered the Hercules Credit Union and robbed Michelle Neff, a
cashier, of $2,000.00. The Defendant told Ms. Neff he had a gun.
The Defendant was
spread.

identified by Ms. Neff

from

a photo

JL

DET. M30N GARNER
Affiant

Subscribed and sworn to before
me this / *T
day of December,
1993.

MAGISTRATE. ,,.,- , .
Authorized for presentment and filing: \ V ^ i ; ^ ^ ! ^
DAVID E. YOCOM, County^Attorney

sptrcy
De|
.... County
. Attorney
^
December 15, 1992
msy/93 001241 '

00010

ADDENDUM B

FILED 8I37H3S7 C0WS7
Third Judicial District

J o * I Z» ^ 4

*eptJly <Sk

In The Third Judicial District Court Of Salt Lake County
State of Utah

THE STATE OF UTAH,

STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT
CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL
AND ORDER

Plaintiff,

vs.
r)

TSofonA
Defendant.

Crimina! No.

COMES NOW,

f f / ^ ^ S V = S

, the defendant in this case and

hereby acknowledges and certifies the following:
I have entered a plea o/(guilty>'(no contest) to the following crime(s):
CRIME & STATUTORY
PROVISION

B.

Ift/JUL
//

r

,

DEGREE

PUNISHMENT
min/max and/or

. ,~,~A UJUfJ/
,, ,,^^
r ",tMAJ;

rJjiAA^ " 7 7 ^ r

SQ<?JU^

~,^^^

jL^tUtz****-^

tt>on

I have received a copy of the (charge) (ljiformation) against me, I have read it, and I
understand the nature and elements of the offense(a)^r whiclj

pleading (guilty) (no

contest).
-^^t^^^^
The elements of the crime(s) of which I am charged are as follows:

J
^

t&L *l~

* Mycorrduct, and the conduct of other persons for which I am criminally liable, that
constitutes the elements of the crime(s) charged are.as follows:

(D/.j ft? #J?*-&t<J' til24 114 six $41 / / / <7-7^

the following facts:
ftbAfrti
te MvMissi.ftftc

rX^syUj^

^^/&yJiM&_

1.
I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I
' ^Ty^n
vo^iarilj/arid
understanding
of
cannot
afford enl£nrtg
one, an mK/tnes^fjIe^)
attorney will be appointed
by thewTth
courtknowledge
at no costand
to me.
I recognize
that a condition of my sentence may be to require me to pay an amount, as determined by
the Court, to recoup thexost of counsel if so appointed for me.
2.

I (fiave not) (have) waived my right to counsel . If I have waived my right to

counsel, I have cfcrnTso knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily for the following reasons:
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3.

If I have waived my right to counsel, I have read this statement and under-

stand the nature and elements of the charges, my rights in this and other proceedings and the
consequences of my plea of guilty.
\i I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is

(£l*^t&l

., and I have had an opportunity to discuss this statement, my rights and
the consequences of my guilty plea with my attorney.
5.

I know that I have a right to a trial by jury.

6.

I know that if I wish to have a trial I have the right to confront and cross-

examine witnesses against me or to have them cross-examined by my attorney. I also know
that I have the right to compel my witness(es) by subpoena at State expense to testify in court
in my behalf.
7.

I know that I have a right to testify in my own behalf but if I choose not to do

so I cannot be compelled to testify or give evidence against myself and no adverse inferences
will be drawn against me if I do not testify.
8.

I know that if I wish to contest the charge against me I need only plead "not

guilty" and the matter will be set for trial. At the trial the State of Utah will have the burden
of proving each element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a
jury the verdict must be unanimous.
9.

I know that under the Constitution of Utah that if I were tried and convicted

by a jury or by the judge that I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence to
the Utah Court of Appeals or, where allowed, the Utah Supreme Court, and that if I could
not afford to pay the costs for such appeal, those costs would be paid by the State.
10.

I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each offense to which

I plead (guilty) (no contest). I know that by pleading (guilty^ (no contest) to an offense that
carries a minimum mandatory sentence that I will be subjecting myself to serving a minimum
mandatory sentence for that offense. I know that the sentences may be consecutive and may
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be for a prison term, fine, or both. I know that in addition to a fine, a (twenty-five [25%])
(eighty-five [85%]) surcharge, required by Utah Code Annotated 63-63a-4, will be imposed.
I also know that I may be ordered by the Court to make restitution to any victim(s) of my
crimes.
11.

I know that imprisonment may be for consecutive periods, or the fine for

additional amount, if my plea is to more than one charge. I also know that if I am on
probation, parole, or awaiting sentencing on another offense of which I have been convicted
or to which I have pled guilty, my plea in the present action may result in consecutive
sentences being imposed upon me.
12.

^-^

I know and understand that by pleading^guilty) (no contest) I am waiving my

statutory and constitutional rights set out in the preceding paragraphs. I also know that by
entering such plea(s) I am admitting and do so admit that I have committed the conduct
alleged and I am guilty of the crime(s) for which my plea(s) is/are entered.
13.

My plea(s) o^tguilty) (no contest) (is) (is not) the result of a plea bargain

between myself and the proseeuting attorney. The promises, duties and provisions of this
plea bargain, if any, are fully contained in the Plea Agreement attached to this affidavit.
14.

I know and understand that if I desire to withdraw my plea(s) of/fguilty) (no

contest), I must do so by filing a motion within thirty (30) days after entry of my plea.
15.

I know that any charge or sentencing concession or recommendation of

probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges for sentencing made or
sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not biding on the judge. I
also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they believe the Court may do are
also not binding on the Court.
16.

No threats, coercion, or unlawful influence of any kind have been made to

induce me to plead guilty, and no promises except those contained herein and in the attached
plea agreement, have been made to me.
4

17.

I have read this statement or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I

understand its provisions. I know that I am free to change or delete anything contained in
this statement. I do not wish to make any changes because all of the statements are correct.
18.

I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney.

19.

I am os / years of age; I have attended school through the

. *. ,
\<s

grade and

I can read and understand the English language or an interpreter has been provided to me. I
was not under the influence of any drugs, medication or intoxicants which would impair my
judgment when the decision was made to enter the plea(s). I am not presently under the
influence of any drug, medication or intoxicants which impair my judgment.
20.

I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind, mentally capable of

understanding the proceedings and the consequences of my plea and free of any mental
disease, defect or impairment that would prevent me from knowingly, intelligently and
voluntarily entering my plea.
DATED this

^\

fO day of /[gjAUL

. 19J24
IMU&

DEFEND Al

(ULS,

CERTIFICATE OF ATTORNEY
I certify that I am the attorney for, j/hLUy

C{ t &&1U?LL& the defendant

above, and that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it to him/her and I
have discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of its
contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief,
after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the
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defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated and these, along with the other representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are accurate and true.

'

&p

'UL Tb- IJJJM*

_^^

ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT/BAR #

CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
/y

J certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against / / / / u

^^C^*-*^^

^'X

I have reviewed this statement of the defendant and find that

the declaration, including the elements of the offense of the charge(s) and the factual synopsis
of the defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the offense are true and correct. No
improper inducements, threats or coercion to encourage a plea have been offered defendant.
The plea negotiations are fully contained in the statement and in the attached plea agreement
or as supplemented on record before the Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the
evidence would support the conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for which the plea(s)
is/are entered and the acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the public irrtf

yf^t^

Wsx^<^

PROSECUTING ATTQKNEY/BAR #

£

ORDER
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing statement and the certification of the
defendant and counsel, the Court witnesses the signatures and firms the defendant's plea(s) of
(guilty) (no contest) is freely and voluntarily made and it is so ordered that the defendant's
plea(s) of (guilty) (no contest) to the charge(s) set fortlyn the statement be accepted and
entered.
DONE IN COURT this ?7

day of

/W^+>€~

19_

^t__
DISTRICT JUDGE
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ADDENDUM C

LEGISLATIVE FLOOR DEBATE ON
HOUSE BILL 3
Laws of Utah 1976, Ch. 9, § 1
(Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203)

SENATE DEBATE
SENATE BUDGET SESSION
DAY 15—JANUARY 26, 1976
SENATOR RINSTROM'S SECOND AMENDMENT TO HOUSE BILL 3

Sen. Rinstrom:

Now, Mr. President, a second motion I would
have to amend this bill as follows is again
in those same places, calling your attention
to line 18 after the word "firearm," add
these words: "or a facsimile or the
representation of the same was used in the
commission or furtherance of a felony."

Mr. President:

Or a facsimile or what?

Sen. Rinstrom:

"or a facsimile or the representation of the
same." Now, let me give you the example of
where I'm going. Sorry to report I
represented a young man on an armed robbery
charge. I was successful in finding him
innocent. He later was arrested on a second
one and confessed to eighteen armed robberies
including the one that I had represented him
on, and he'd all done it with a cap pistol.
But the people at the other end of that
barrel didn't know what they were facing, and
they were just as in great a shock and trauma
as if a real gun had been pointed to them.
So I think that we ought to include a
facsimile. Or, this would also include the
man who has his hand in his pocket and points
it at you and says, "I have a gun here, and
if you don't hand over the cash, I'm going to
shoot you." So, what this amendment would do
is saying that if a person uses a gun, its
facsimile, or represents that he has a
firearm, he could equally be sentenced to an
additional five years. That's the purpose of
the amendment.

Mr. President:

Senator Brockbank.
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Sen. Brockbank:

(inaudible) representation of same to
representation of a firearm.

Mr. President:

That's good.

Sen. Brockbank:

Because I think you might refer back to a
facsimile.

Mr. President:

That's right.

Sen. Brockbank:

(inaudible) to firearms.

Sen. Rinstrom:

And the representation of a firearm.

Mr. President:

And that will also have to go into all three
places?

Sen. Rinstrom:

That's correct.

Mr. President:

Okay. That carries a bit more significance
than the other one, I would think, if it
(inaudible) some gesture on the part of the
person as opposed to carrying a real firearm.

Sen. Rinstrom:

I might say that this bill does not deal just
with robberies. It's the commission of any
felony in which a firearm would be used, a
facsimile or the representation.

Mr. President:

Would this be a representation.

Sen. Rinstrom:

I don't think if you pointed your finger at
me that that would be a representation.
But—

Mr. President:

It might look like a gun—

Sen. Rinstrom:

Well-

Mr. President:

to somebody in the dark.

Sen. Rinstrom:

I think a reasonable man, if he was seeing
that, would not conclude that you had a
firearm. If you came up behind me at night
and stuck your finger in your back and said,
"This is a gun. If you don't hand me your
wallet, I'm going to shoot you,11 that would
be a representation, yes.

That's a good suggestion.
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That's right.

Mr. President:

Any further discussion on the motion?

All in

favor of the motion say, "aye.11
Body:

Aye.

Mr. President:

Opposed, "no.11

Body:
Mr. President:

No.
The motion carries. If there are no further
questions, then I have a question I want to
ask you, but before I do, Senator Howell.
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ADDENDUM D

HOUSE DEBATE
LEGISLATIVE BUDGET SESSION
DAY 16—JANUARY 27, 1976
REPRESENTATIVE HANSEN'S EXPLANATION OF SENATE AMENDMENT AND HOUSE
ADOPTION OF AMENDMENT

Mr. Speaker:

Representative Hansen, Dave Hansen, we have
here a communication from the Senate
regarding House Bill No. 3, and it appears
that they have made some amendments. Have
you had a chance to look at those? We can
pass it if you have not.

Rep. Hansen:

Mr. Speaker, I have had the opportunity to
look at those. I think it strengthens the
bill. I would move that the House accept
that.

Mr. Speaker:

Okay. Let's read the communication, then
I'll recognize the motion.

Rep. Hansen:

Thank you.

Secretary:

Mr. Speaker, I am directed to inform your
honorable body that the Senate has this day
passed, as amended by the Senate under
suspension of the rules, House Bill 3,
increase in sentence, by Mr. Jones,
Mr. Salas, et al. and the same is returned
herewith for your further action (inaudible)

Mr. Speaker:

Representatives, I'll call your attention to
the goldenrod copy of House Bill 3 which
you'll find in your book. The goldenrod copy
contains the amendments made by the Senate to
the Bill. If you'll take a look at that,
please. The communication from the Senate
indicates they're sending the Bill in its
amended form. Representative Hansen.

Rep. Hansen:

Mr. Speaker, I've reviewed this and what, in
effect, it is, if you use a facsimile of a
gun or you put your finger in the back of
someone and say it is a gun or hold your coat
or something similar to that, the same
sentence could be imposed upon a felon who
did that. I think it's effect strengthens
the Bill and I would make the motion that we
accept the amendment of the Senate.
1

Mr. Speaker:

The motion is that we concur with the Senate
amendment. The motion has been seconded. Is
there any discussion? Seeing no further
discussion, all in favor say "aye."

Body:

Aye.

Mr. Speaker:

Any opposed, "no."

Body:

(none)

Mr. Speaker:

The motion is carried and we have concurred.
And now, Representatives, it becomes
necessary for us to vote again on the Bill as
passed by the Senate and with the amendments.
We can do that now. House Bill 3. Okay,
Representatives, I'm going to open voting on
House Bill 3. This is a bill that we've
debated in the past. The Senate has amended
it. We've just accepted sentence amendments.
And so, voting is open on House Bill 3, if
you would. (inaudible) has voted on House
Bill 3 and therefore voting is closed. House
Bill 3, having received fifty yes votes and
three no votes, has again passed, will be
returned now to the Senate for the signature
of the President of the Senate.
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